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Abstract: 
We analyze the venture capitalist's decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the 
fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a 
company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capital-
ist's participation in a firm (later IPO) may increase its value while also increasing costs for 
the venture capitalist. Due to his active involvement, the venture capitalist knows the type of 
firm and the kind of project he finances before potential new investors do. This information 
asymmetry is resolved at the end of the second period. Under certain assumptions about the 
parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-
quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, 
while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two 
periods or after one financing period using a lock-up. Whether a strategy of one or two financ-
ing periods is chosen depends on the consulting intensity of the project and / or on the experi-
ence of the venture capitalist. In the separating equilibrium, the offer price corresponds to the 
true value of the firm. 
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 1 Introduction
The life of a venture capital fund is limited: in the US it is usually set at a maximum
of ten years (see Sahlman, 1990). After this period, the capital providers (typically large
institutional investors) want to harvest the revenues from their investments in venture
capital funds and evaluate the venture capitalists. Therefore, the investment period of
venture capitalists in young ¯rms is short, usually 3 to 7 years (see Barry, 1994). The
returns from their investment are the capital gains raised after a successful build-up of the
business rather than regular dividend returns (see OECD, 2002). Hence, the development
of a viable venture capital market essentially depends on the existence of suitable exit
routes, which provide opportunities for high returns.
Initial public o®erings (IPOs) are generally considered to be the most pro¯table exit route
(see Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Second-tier or parallel markets are the place where
most of the venture backed ¯rms that go public are initially listed. The existence of
such markets for young dynamic ¯rms is considered to be essential for the venture capital
industry (see e.g. Black and Gilson, 1998). Several empirical papers con¯rm the positive
role of a viable IPO market on venture capital activity: Jeng and Wells (2000) found out
that IPOs were the most powerful driver of venture capital investing. Gompers (1998)
saw a surging market for venture-backed IPOs as one of the main reasons for the dramatic
increase in venture capital commitments in the US. In our paper, we concentrate on this
exit channel. For simplicity, liquidation is considered to be the only exit alternative to the
IPO.
In practice, we observe that (1) venture-backed ¯rms go public at di®erent times in the
¯rms life and after being ¯nanced by venture capital for di®erent time horizons; (2) the
venture capitalists usually exit only partially at the IPO and commit themselves to hold
part of their shares for several months beyond the IPO (lock-up) and (3) there are large
di®erences in the level of these post-IPO shareholdings by venture capitalists. Our aim is
to shed light on these issues. Within a single model, we explain how a venture capitalist
chooses the timing, the price and the amount of shares to be sold in an IPO.
Venture capitalists o®er a combined provision of capital and managerial experience (see
e.g. Casamatta (2003) for a theoretical analysis or Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (2001) for an
empirical one). They monitor strategic and managerial decisions and tend to take an
active role in advising the ¯rm and providing it with valuable business contacts (e.g. with
consultants, lawyers, investment bankers) or quali¯ed sta®. Based on US data, Hellmann
and Puri (2002) found out that companies that obtain venture capital are more likely
and/or quicker to become professional than their non venture-backed counterparts. In our
model, we consider two periods and two types of ¯rms (high- and low-quality). Each ¯rm
carries out a single project. The projects of high-quality ¯rms di®er in the role that the
venture capitalist can play. The higher the consulting intensity of a project, the more the
venture capitalist's managerial activities enhance the ¯rm's value in the second period. If
the project has a low consulting intensity, the venture capitalist's managerial contribution
adds only little value in the second period. In a slight modi¯cation of the model we analyze
the impact of the venture capitalist's experience instead of the consulting intensity of the
1project. The more mature the venture capitalist is, the more his managerial activities
increase the ¯rm's value in the second period.
As active investors, venture capitalists know the young ¯rms which they ¯nance better
than the potential new investors. The timing and the extent of the IPO in°uences the
new investors' assessment of the quality of the ¯rm. The younger the ¯rms are, the higher
the information asymmetry is between the venture capitalist and the new investors. Here
we assume that the venture capitalist knows the ¯rm and project characteristics in t=1,
with the NIs receiving the information in t=2. In t=1, the NIs only know the probability
distributions over ¯rm types and project kinds. Thus, if the venture capitalist takes a
high-quality ¯rm public in t=1, he may want to signal that the IPO is not a means of
getting rid of low-quality stocks. Rather, he would like to demonstrate that his reason
for selling the company is a low bene¯t of his managerial support because the project
is not very consulting intensive (or because the venture capitalist does not have enough
experience). A costly obligation of not selling a part of his shares for a certain period of
time (lock-up) can serve as such a signaling device.
Our paper is di®erent from the existing theoretical research on venture capital and venture
capitalist's exit, which typically deals with the choice of the optimal exit channel assuming
(and analyzing) a con°ict between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur (see BerglÄ of,
1994 or Bascha and Walz, 2001). We do not consider this kind of con°ict. Instead,
our paper analyzes the information asymmetry between the old investor (the venture
capitalist) and the potential new investors. We introduce a new aspect: the timing of the
exit.
Our model points out the role of the value added by the venture capitalist. One of the
di®erences between the venture capitalist and the new investors who buy the ¯rm at the
IPO is that the former o®er not only money but also managerial support that enhances
the value of the high-quality ¯rm. Since the IPO reduces the venture capitalist's stake in
the ¯rm, incentives to be active in the management of the company are diminished after
the IPO. The potential value added from the non-monetary contribution by the venture
capitalist depends on the ¯rm type (high- or low-quality) and the kind of project. For
low-quality ¯rms (in both periods) and for the projects with the lowest consulting intensity
(in the second period), the potential value added from the non-monetary contribution is
zero. In these cases, the venture capitalist wants to exit his ¯rm as soon as possible, since
binding his resources there is costly. However, the new investors who purchase shares from
venture capitalists do not observe the quality of young ¯rms and the kind of projects. In
order to receive a higher price for his shares, the venture capitalist who owns a high-
quality ¯rm has to prove its quality. He must either ¯nance his ¯rm longer (until the ¯rm
gets older and the information asymmetries are mitigated), which might be too costly
for projects with a low consulting intensity, or signal the quality of the young ¯rm going
public. We will show under which conditions a separating equilibrium holds in which
low-quality ¯rms are liquidated and high-quality ¯rms go public either after one period
with a lock-up (lower consulting intensity) or after two periods without a lock-up (higher
consulting intensity).
2A slightly modi¯ed model analyzes the impact of the venture capitalist's experience instead
of the consulting intensity of a project. Under certain conditions we get a separating
equilibrium that is analogous to that of the basic model: low-quality ¯rms are liquidated
and high-quality ¯rms go public either after one period with a lock-up (¯rms backed by
a young venture capital ¯rm) or after two periods without a lock-up (¯rms backed by a
mature venture capital ¯rm).
Considering the possibility of signaling through a lock-up, our paper contributes to the
existing literature on the IPO and signaling (see Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, Grinblatt and
Hwang, 1989 or Welch, 1989). A seminal paper on signaling as a means of information
transfer between the informed entrepreneur and the uninformed new investors is Leland
and Pyle (1977). They show that the entrepreneur's willingness to invest in his own project
can serve as a signal of the project quality. In contrast to our model, the above-mentioned
models deal with investors in general, instead of venture capitalists in particular. In our
model, we try to capture the following three speci¯c features of venture capitalists and
venture-backed IPOs: (1) the combined provision of capital and management experience,
(2) the superior information of venture capitalists on the companies they ¯nance and
(3) the limited investment horizon of venture capitalists. A paper related to ours that
considers lock-up and venture capital is Neus and Walz (2002). They consider the timing
of IPOs as given and ask whether or not the venture capitalists use a lock-up. In contrast,
the central issue of the model we develop in the subsequent sections concerns the timing of
the IPO. A number of recent papers explores the lock-up expiry, particularly the behavior
of the share price around this date (see Ofek and Richardson, 2000, Espenlaub, Goergen
and Khurshed, 2001 or Keasler, 2001).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: section 2 will present the structure of
the model, the analysis of the exit decision will be carried out in section 3, and, ¯nally,
section 4 will conclude and o®er some empirically testable implications derived from the
theoretical analysis.
2 Setup of the Model
Our model consists of two periods, two types of ¯rms (high- and low-quality) and (a)
in¯nitely many possible kinds of projects that di®er in the role of the non-monetary
contribution by the venture capitalist in the basic model / (b) in¯nitely many possible
experience levels of venture capital ¯rms in the modi¯ed model. Each venture capitalist
(VC) ¯nances completely a single ¯rm from the start of the ¯rst period when the ¯rm
is founded (t=0). Each ¯rm carries out a single project. The value of the ¯rm depends
on its type, kind of project (the experience of the VC in the modi¯ed model) and VC's
monetary investment and non-monetary contribution. At the end of each period there are
numerous new investors (NIs) who are interested in buying ¯rms in public markets from
the VCs. The issues we want to analyze are in which period a VC exits his investment
and what divestment strategy he chooses. All VCs and NIs are risk neutral and rational
investors.
3Further, we assume that:
1. the parameters, functional forms, structure of the game and players' rationality are
common knowledge among the players;
2. the venture capitalist chooses the strategy (timing, exit channel, price per share
and number of shares sold at the IPO) that maximizes his pro¯t given the known
expectation formation by the NIs;
3. there are in¯nitely many new investors with identical and rational beliefs who in
t=1 and t=2 are willing to pay a price per share that equals the share value they
expect.
The VC can exit his investment either after one (t=1) or after two (t=2) periods. He may
choose one of the following options: to liquidate the ¯rm, sell the entire ¯rm at the time
of the IPO or disinvest sequentially (sell a part of his shares at the end of the ¯rst period
and the rest at the end of the second). The VC cannot retain any shares beyond t=2 since
his investment horizon is limited to a maximum of two periods. The time structure is
the following (see Figure 1): in t=0 the ¯rm is founded and the venture capital ¯nancing
starts; in t=1 the nature determines the type of ¯rm and the kind of project and the VC
gets this information; then, he has to decide whether or not he will continue to ¯nance
the ¯rm until t=2. With the exception of projects with the lowest consulting intensity,
the VC's further monetary and non-monetary contribution in the second period increase
the value of the H-¯rm (and, therefore, the price that NIs will be willing to pay).
Figure 1: The Time Structure of the Model
t=0 t=1 t=2
Start of the
VC Financing
Further VC
Financing
Partial Exit
(Lock-up)
Complete Exit
(Complete IPO / Liquidation)
Complete Exit
(Sale of the
remaining shares /
IPO / Liquidation) -
-
-
-
Before a new period starts (in t=0, t=1 and t=2), this growing ¯rm needs a monetary
investment I (exogenously given) to ¯nance its activities in the coming period. Without
this investment the ¯rm cannot survive. Prior to the IPO, these investments are ¯nanced
by the VC as the sole investor. In the period that follows the IPO, the revenues raised
for the new issue cover the investment demands of the expanding ¯rm. After being listed,
4the ¯rm gains access to the credit markets, which ¯nance any further investments in later
periods.
After the ¯rst period, the VC can choose one of the following four actions (see Figure 1):
1. To take the ¯rm public (at costs) and sell all shares. The NIs do not know the ¯rm's
value and the VC does not signal it. In the second period, the investment demands
of the ¯rm are ¯nanced by the NIs through the issue of new shares and there is no
non-monetary contribution by the VC.
2. To take the ¯rm public (at costs) and sell only part of the shares (lock-up). The
NIs do not know the ¯rm's value and the VC signals it through the lock-up. In the
second period, the investment demands of the ¯rm are ¯nanced by the NIs through
the issue of new shares and there is no non-monetary contribution by the VC. The
VC has a cost in the second period proportional to the amount of shares retained.
He sells the remaining shares at t=2.
3. To ¯nance the ¯rm for another period. The investment demands in the second period
are ¯nanced by the VC and he also o®ers the non-monetary contribution.
4. To liquidate the ¯rm.
Under conditions that will be speci¯ed later, the following separating equilibrium exists:
low-quality ¯rms are liquidated in t=1 and high-quality ¯rms are sold either per partes in
t=1 and t=2 (lock-up) or as a whole in t=2 depending on the kind of project (experience
of the VC in the modi¯ed model) and, hence, the role of the managerial contribution by
the VC.
If the ¯rm goes public in t=1, new shares are issued and the VC may sell some or all of
his old shares. For simplicity, let the number of original shares (= before the IPO) be
one. It is, however, possible to split this share. It is held solely by the VC since t=0. The
number (and the fraction) of the original shares sold by the venture capitalist at the IPO
is denoted by a (no lock-up: a=1, lock-up: 0 · a < 1). The number of new shares issued
(and bought by the NIs) is d. Thus, the total number of shares after the IPO is 1 + d.
A venture capitalist is actively involved in the company he ¯nances. The higher the
shareholdings of the venture capitalist in a period, the higher his administrative costs in
this period. In the ¯rst period, when he holds the complete ¯rm, the administrative cost
equals B. In the second period, when he holds (1 ¡ a) shares, the cost amounts to
B ¢ (1 ¡ a) : (1)
When he does not sell any shares in t=1, the administrative cost of the VC in the second
period is B. The more shares sold in t=1 (higher a), the lower the shareholdings and,
obviously, the administrative cost of the VC in the second period.
Two types ¾ of ¯rms exist. The ¯rms have either high or low quality (¾ 2 fH, Lg) with
equal probability in t=0 (Prob(¾=H) = Prob(¾=L) = 0.5). In t=0 neither the VC nor
the NIs know the true type of ¯rm; they only know the percentage of high-quality ¯rms.
5Since the VC is deeply involved in ¯rm activities he recognizes the type earlier than the
potential NIs do. We assume that the VC knows the type of ¯rm in t=1 and the NIs in
t=2 when the ¯rm grows older and more track record is available.
At the IPO new and old shares are o®ered. The VC gets the revenues from selling the
original shares since he has been their sole owner. The ¯rm obtains the revenues from
the new issue. We assume that the new issue exactly covers the investment demands
of the ¯rm in the period following the IPO. The number of new shares issued d is then
determined by the exogenously given investment demand I and the share price p(.) that
the VC sets
d =
I
p(.)
: (2)
In front of the IPO, the VC chooses the price p(.) he wants to receive per share and
the fraction a of his shares he wants to sell and announces this information to the new
investors. The number of new shares is determined through (2). The issue of how price
is set by the venture capitalist will be explained later in this section. In the course of the
IPO, any new investor may buy shares at this price. If the new shares were not sold, the
investment demands of the ¯rm could not be met and the ¯rm would be liquidated.1 As
the VC is rational and he maximizes his utility, this would never happen. The VC knows
the expectation building of the NIs and, hence, the combination of price and number of
shares they will accept. The VC would never spend the IPO costs and then let the IPO
fail by choosing a non-acceptable combination of price and number of shares he o®ers.
Liquidation would be the more pro¯table strategy for him.
The value of a ¯rm depends on the ¯rm's type. The value of an L-¯rm is always zero. Nei-
ther the monetary investment nor the non-monetary contribution of the VC can increase
the value of the type L.
WL(t) = 0 t 2 f0;1;2g: (3)
The VC invests exogenously given amounts I (as a monetary investment) and B (as a
non-monetary contribution) in each period in which he completely ¯nances the ¯rm. The
value of an H-¯rm depends on the sum of the monetary investments and the non-monetary
contributions as well as the kind of project (the experience of the VC in the modi¯ed
model). The rate of return on the investment is k ¡ 1 (k > 1).
Each ¯rm carries out a single project. The projects of high-quality ¯rms di®er in their
consulting intensity which is denoted by r 2 [0;1]. The probability over the project kinds
in t=0 is equally distributed on the interval [0,1]. The information structure here is the
same as for the type of ¯rm. In t=1 the VC can observe the kind of project that is being
¯nanced and, therefore, how large the potential value is which might be added to the ¯rm
by his further non-monetary contribution. The NIs cannot see this feature in t=1. They
know only the probability distribution.
1In our model, either all (announced fraction of old shares plus the new issue) or no o®ered shares are
sold because in¯nitely many identical new investors exist. If the price is \reasonable", all o®ered shares
are sold because the demand is in¯nite. If the price was \too high", nobody would buy any shares.
6A modi¯cation of the model lets the parameter r vary with the characteristics of the
venture capital ¯rm. Mature venture capital ¯rms with more experience have higher
values of r.
The higher the consulting intensity of a project / experience of the VC (higher r) is, the
more value the VC's non-monetary contribution in the second period adds. If a venture
capitalist is present in an H-¯rm, his non-monetary contribution adds value kB in the ¯rst
period. The VC's full engagement in the second period raises the value of the type H
further by rkB. If a VC takes a ¯rm public in t=1 and retains some or all of the original
shares (lock-up), his fraction of the ¯rm shrinks after the IPO. Therefore, his claim to
actively manage the company is diluted and his incentives are diminished. For conve-
nience, we assume that if the ¯rm goes public in t=1 and the VC retains some shares until
t=2, he no longer adds value to the company. He still has some administrative costs (see
(1)) related to his presence in the ¯rm, however. The costs and bene¯ts from the VC's
non-monetary contribution to an H-¯rm are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: The managerial contribution by the VC to an H-¯rm
(net bene¯ts = bene¯ts - costs; k > 1)
Exit channel Complete IPO Complete IPO Lock-up
in t=1 in t=2
First Period: kB-B kB-B kB-B
NET BENEFITS
Second Period: 0-0 rkB-B 0-B¢(1-a)
NET BENEFITS
Every investment I that is carried out either by the VC or by the NIs (through buying the
new stock) increases the value of the H-¯rm by kI. The bene¯ts from the non-monetary
contribution of the venture capitalist raise the value of the ¯rm additively. The value of
an H-¯rm at the IPO is thus the sum of the bene¯ts from the monetary investments by
the venture capitalist (their number equals the number of pre-IPO periods t in which the
¯rm has been ¯nanced by venture capital), the bene¯ts from the investment carried out
by the NIs at the IPO and the bene¯ts from the non-monetary contribution of the VC
before the IPO. If the IPO is conducted in t=1, the value of an H-¯rm is
WH(tjt = 1) = k ¢ (2I + B) : (4)
If an H-¯rm is completely ¯nanced by the VC for two periods, its value at the end of the
second period depends on the kind of project / experience of the VC (parameter r):
WHr(tjt = 2) = k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] : (5)
We assume that there are in¯nitely many new investors who want to buy the new stock.
The VC has all the bargaining power, which enables him to extract the entire surplus.
The NIs do not know the value of the ¯rm in t=1. The veri¯cation of the ¯rm type and
7the project kind is impossible (i.e. very costly). We denote the value of the ¯rm that
the NIs expect after the IPO in t by E[W¾r(t)]. In t=2, the NIs have full information
so that E[W¾r(tjt = 2)] equals the true value, which is 0 for an L-¯rm (see (3)) and
k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] for an H-¯rm (see (5)).
After the IPO, the total number of shares consists of 1 old share plus d new shares. The
value of a share that the NIs expect during and after the IPO equals the expected value
of the ¯rm divided by the (known) number of shares
E[W¾r(t)]
1 + d
: (6)
If E[W¾r(t)] < I, the NIs do not buy any shares (see Appendix A for the proof.) The
intuition is the following: if the NIs bought new shares and hence invested the amount of
I, their investment would generate a negative net expected value due to the fact that after
this investment, the expected value of the ¯rm would be lower than the investment itself.
Therefore, the NIs prefer to retain their funds and do not buy any shares. If E[W¾r(t)] ¸ I,
the NIs are willing to pay the price of (6) per share. Combining (6) and (2) we get the
maximum price per share p(E[W¾r(t)];I) that the NIs are willing to pay at the IPO
p(E[W¾r(t)];I) = maxfE[W¾r(t)] ¡ I; 0g : (7)
For this price, the VC may sell as many shares as he wants since there are in¯nitely many
investors with identical beliefs. (However, the number of shares sold in t=1 in°uences the
expectation building by the NIs.) If the venture capitalist were to set a higher price, the
demand for shares would be 0. If he were to set a lower price than the maximum price
per share p(E[W¾r(t)];I) that the NIs were willing to pay, he would only diminish his
own pro¯t, which equals the revenue from selling the shares minus the cost.2 The issue
of how NIs form their expectations in t=1 will be analyzed in the next section. We will
show that the choice of the price alone by the VC has no impact on expectation building
by the NIs. The venture capitalist, as a pro¯t maximizer and a sophisticated investor
who understands the expectation building process of the NIs, sets the maximum possible
price he can receive when he exits via IPO (complete IPO in t=1, complete IPO in t=2,
lock-up). If the IPO takes place in t=2, the NIs are fully informed. Then, the share price
of an L-¯rm in t=2 would be 0, while the share price of an H-¯rm at the IPO would reach
k ¢ (3I + (1 + r) ¢ B) ¡ I.
When lock-up is used, after the ¯rst period a old shares are sold by the VC for the price
p(E[W¾(tjt = 1)];I) = maxfE[W¾(tjt = 1)] ¡ I; 0g.3 The rest of the shares (1 ¡ a) is
sold in t=2 for the price p(E[W¾(lock)];I). Since there is full information in t=2, the
maximum possible price that the NIs are willing to pay corresponds to the true value of
2In the lock-up case, a lower price at the IPO in t=1 would additionally lead to a dilution of the
remaining VC's holdings and hence to a lower price per share and lower revenues in t=2 because more
new shares had to be issued in t=1 in order to ¯nance I.
3Obviously, the type of project does not play any role in the ¯rm's value in the case of a lock-up. In
t=1 the NIs enter, and the VC's presence in the ¯rm no longer increases the ¯rm's value in the second
period.
8the ¯rm, which for type H equals E[W¾(tjt = 1)] = WH(tjt = 1) = k ¢ (2I + B). Thus, the
maximum price per share which the NIs are willing to pay in t=2 for the rest (1 ¡ a) of
the shares depends on the value of the ¯rm and the number of shares issued in the ¯rst
period (see (2) and (6)).
p(E[W¾(lock)];I) =
8
> > <
> > :
p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
p + I
for an H-type,
0 for an L-type,
(8)
where p > 0 is the price per share in t=1.
If the VC completely ¯nances the ¯rm until t 2 f1;2g, he ¯nances t-times the investment I
and spends administrative costs of t-times B. The total VC's ¯nancing cost then amounts
to t ¢ (I + B). In the case of a lock-up, he spends I + B(2 ¡ a) because he completely
¯nances the ¯rst period causing costs of I+B, and he retains (1¡a) shares between t=1
and t=2 causing costs of B(1 ¡ a). Further, there are some negligible IPO costs of ² that
make an IPO slightly more expensive than a liquidation (for every ° 2 R+ : 0 < ² < °).
The consequence is that if the maximum possible price the VC can get at the IPO in t is
zero, he prefers liquidation in t.
The VC chooses that exit strategy which maximizes his pro¯t. We have already argued
why he chooses the maximum possible price he can receive. Under di®erent exit channels,
the VC then reaches the following levels of pro¯t:
1. Since there are no revenues in the case of liquidation, the pro¯t ¼¾
liq(t) of the VC
who liquidates a ¯rm in t 2 f1;2g will be the negative sum of the monetary and
non-monetary expenditures
¼¾
liq(t) = ¼H
liq(t) = ¼L
liq(t) = ¡t ¢ (I + B) : (9)
2. If an IPO takes place in t 2 f1;2g, the pro¯t of the VC amounts to the di®erence
between the revenues from the IPO and the costs.
² Without a lock-up (complete IPO) the pro¯t is
¼¾r
ipo(t) = E[W¾r(t)] ¡ (t + 1) ¢ I ¡ t ¢ B ¡ ² ; (10)
² with a lock-up (partial IPO) the pro¯t reaches
¼¾
lock = a ¢ p(E[W¾(tjt = 1)]) + (1 ¡ a) ¢ p(E[W¾(lock)];I)
¡ I ¡ (2 ¡ a)B ¡ ² : (11)
In the next section we show, that under certain assumptions about the parameters of the
model a single equilibrium exists, in which high-quality ¯rms separate from low-quality
¯rms. The latter are liquidated after the ¯rst period. The former go public either after
having been ¯nanced by venture capital for two periods or after one ¯nancing period using
9a lock-up. The VC's decision between one or two periods depends on the kind of project
(experience of the VC in the modi¯ed model). For ¯rms with less consulting intensive
projects (¯rms ¯nanced by a less experienced VC in the modi¯ed model), for which the
managerial contribution of the VC in the second period adds only a low value, the lock-up
serves as a signaling device to indicate high quality.
3 Exit Decision
3.1 Information Symmetry
In order to demonstrate how the model is designed and to get a benchmark for the more
realistic case of information asymmetry, we ¯rst consider the case of symmetric informa-
tion. Under symmetric information everybody already knows the type of ¯rm in t=1.
Hence, the new investors' expectations in t=1 are the following (see (3) and (4)):
E[W¾(tjt = 1)] =
(
WH(tjt = 1) = k ¢ (2I + B) for an H-type,
WL(tjt = 1) = 0 for an L-type.
Proposition 1 (SYMMETRIC INFORMATION):
Let k := B+I
I and r¤ := B+I¡kI
kB (r¤ 2 (0;1)). We assume that k < k.4
If everybody knows the ¯rm type in t=1, then a type L will be liquidated in t=1 and a type
H will go public in either t=1 (for r · r¤) or in t=2 (for r > r¤). The VC sells all his
shares at the IPO (no lock-up). The price per share in t=1 equals k¢(2I+B)¡I, the price
per share in t=2 is k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] ¡ I.
Intuition
L-type (see Appendix B for the proof)
The liquidation of an L-¯rm in t=1 is the pro¯t maximizing strategy for the VC (with
the pro¯t ¼L
liq(tjt = 1) = ¡I ¡ B). The reason is that since the NIs know that the type
of the ¯rm is L (and its value equals 0), they never pay a positive price for its shares.
Thus, no other strategy would generate higher pro¯ts (in this case a lower loss) for the
VC than liquidation in t=1: Further ¯nancing in the second period generates additional
costs of I+B and no revenues and, therefore, will not be chosen by the VC. The lock-up is
not possible since the NIs would not ¯nance the necessary investment I in t=1 (because
E[W¾(tjt = 1)] = WL(tjt = 1) = 0 < I). The complete IPO in t=1 generates no revenues
compared to the liquidation but causes additionally IPO costs of ². Hence, liquidation in
t=1 is the pro¯t maximizing strategy.
4The other case
B+I
I · k is not interesting because in this case all H-¯rms would be held by the VC
until t=2 due to the high rate of return.
10H-type (see Appendix C for the proof)
The VC who ¯nances an H-¯rm can earn pro¯ts by selling his shares. If the IPO takes
place in t=1 (when E[W¾(tjt = 1)] = WH(tjt = 1) = k ¢ (2I + B)), the pro¯t of the VC is
equal to (see (7) and (10))
¼H
ipo(tjt = 1) = (k ¡ 1) ¢ (2I + B) ¡ ² : (12)
If the IPO takes place in t=2 (when E[W¾r(tjt = 2)] = WHr(tjt = 2)), the pro¯t of the
VC amounts to (see (5), (7), and (10))
¼Hr
ipo(tjt = 2) = k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] ¡ 3I ¡ 2B ¡ ² : (13)
The VC prefers to sell all his shares at the IPO since his pro¯t from the lock-up would
only be (k ¡ 1) ¢ (2I + B) ¡ B ¢ (1 ¡ a) ¡ ², which is less than the pro¯t from the complete
IPO in t=1 (see (12)). Lock-up generates no additional revenues but raises additional
costs of B ¢ (1 ¡ a) for the venture capitalist's involvement in the second period. The VC
takes a ¯rm with r · r¤ in t=1 public and a ¯rm with r > r¤ in t=2. The pro¯t levels
are ¼H
ipo(tjt = 1) (see(12)) for the former and ¼Hr
ipo(tjt = 2) (see(13)) for the latter case.
Whether or not the NIs already know the kind of project (experience of the VC in the
modi¯ed model) in t=1 does not a®ect the result. ¥
3.2 Information Asymmetry
3.2.1 Basic Model
We next consider a more relevant distribution of information where the VC, as an active
investor, has an information advantage over the NIs. He knows the type of ¯rm and the
kind of project he ¯nances earlier than the NIs. In t=0 nobody knows the value of either
of the two parameters. We assume that if the ¯rm has been ¯nanced by the VC only for
one period (t=1), the NIs recognize neither its type nor the kind of project at the time of
the IPO. At this time they know only the probability distribution over the two ¯rm types
and the kinds of projects. The VC knows the value of both of these parameters in t=1.
The information advantage of the VC disappears in t=2 when the NIs can observe the
true value of the ¯rm.
In what follows, we investigate the decision of the pro¯t maximizing VC in t=1 for an
L-¯rm and an H-¯rm with di®erent kinds of projects. Under certain assumptions, which
will be analyzed here, a unique (separating) equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 (ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - H-¯rm with r > r¤):
If r > r¤, then an H-¯rm goes public in t=2 and the VC sells the whole ¯rm at the IPO.
The price per share is k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] ¡ I.
11Intuition
If the project for which r > r¤ is sold in t=2 for the maximum possible price, the pro¯t
of the VC is k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] ¡ 3I ¡ 2B ¡ ². This is exactly the same pro¯t as in the
information symmetry case (see section 3.1), since in t=2 the information asymmetries
between the VC and the NIs are dissolved. Under information asymmetry, none of the
other exit channels (an IPO in t=1 with or without a lock-up or liquidation) can generate
higher pro¯ts than in the case of the symmetric information. The reason is that in all these
cases the costs remain unchanged while in neither case the revenues can be increased. If
the VC were to choose a higher price per share, no shares would be sold. If the price were
lower, the pro¯t would shrink. Therefore, under asymmetric information in t=1, the VC
takes a type H who has a project with r > r¤ in t=2 public for the price per share of
k¢[3I+(1+r)¢B]¡I. He chooses the same strategy as in the reference case of information
symmetry. ¥
Let us now analyze which strategy is chosen by the VC for an L-¯rm and for an H-¯rm
that has a less consulting intensive project (r · r¤). Financing this project, the VC
has low comparative advantage against the NIs in raising the ¯rm's value in the second
period. Due to administrative costs, a type H with such a project goes public in t=1 under
information symmetry. Type L is liquidated in t=1. If there is asymmetric information,
observing a complete IPO in t=1, the NIs cannot distinguish between an H-¯rm and an
L-¯rm. The VC who ¯nances a type L prefers a complete IPO in t=1 to a liquidation
whenever he can get a share price which is higher than the IPO costs ². The maximum
price that the NIs are willing to pay when a complete IPO takes place in t=1 may be \too
low" for an H-¯rm. Waiting until the information asymmetries are resolved or selling only
a part of his shares in t=1 may be more pro¯table for the VC. In order to determine the
price that the NIs will be willing to pay in t=1, we have to analyze the NIs' expectation
building. To do this, we have to look at the VC's payo®s from di®erent strategies under
asymmetric information and ¯nd out the pro¯t maximizing strategy.
Each ¯rm has ¯ve possible exit channels: IPO in t=1 with a lock-up, IPO in t=1 without
a lock-up, IPO in t=2, liquidation in t=1 and liquidation in t=2. Obviously, liquidation
in any period is strictly dominated by the IPO in t=2 for an H-¯rm. Thus, an H-¯rm goes
public. For an L-¯rm, further venture capital ¯nancing in the second period (an IPO or a
liquidation in t=2) is strictly dominated by the liquidation in t=1. After the elimination
of these strictly dominated strategies of both types, we have three exit channels for each
type to be considered.
The following three aspects of the IPO process can be distinguished: (1) the timing (t=1
or t=2), (2) the quantity of shares sold at the time of IPO (a=1 or a < 1) and (3) the
price per share p(.). If we assume that a ¯rm goes public in t=1 and that the VC o®ers
all of his shares at the IPO (a=1), then we have already determined the ¯rst two of the
three characteristics. In this case, there is no possibility for H to separate from L. The
reason is that any price higher than ² that the VC demands for a type H in t=1 would
result in an IPO of an L-¯rm in t=1 as well. A price per share lower than ² that would
12prevent an L-¯rm from the IPO will not be chosen by an H-¯rm since this strategy for
him is strictly dominated by the IPO in t=2.
Assuming that both types may participate in the IPO in t=1, the NIs would expect a
¯rm's value E[W¾(tjt = 1)]pool that is not higher than the average ¯rm's value over both
types of ¯rm in t=1.
E[W¾(tjt = 1)]pool · Prob(¾ = H) ¢ WH(tjt = 1)
+ Prob(¾ = L) ¢ WL =
=
k ¢ (2I + B)
2
: (14)
The maximum possible pooling price per share would then be maxf
k¢(2I+B)
2 ¡I; 0g. If the
VC demanded a higher price for a complete IPO, NIs would not buy any shares. Hence,
the pro¯t of the VC who would sell a type H in t=1 via IPO without a lock-up would be
not higher than maxf
k¢(2I+B)
2 ¡ 2I ¡ B ¡ ²;¡I ¡ B ¡ ²g.
Proposition 3 (ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - optimal lock-up strategy):
Let us assume that a pro¯t maximizing VC ¯nances an H-¯rm. If he prefers the lock-up
to the complete IPO, then he sets the share price at p¤ = k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I, and he sells a
fraction a¤ = B
k(2I+B)¡I+B of old shares in t=1.
Intuition (see Appendixes D and E for the proof)
Under p* and a*, a VC who ¯nances an L-¯rm prefers liquidation in t=1 to the lock-up
in t=1 (see Appendix D). Therefore, if a = a*, the new investors are willing to pay the
price p* per share that corresponds to the value of an H-type. Now we will show that a
pro¯t maximizing VC would not choose another lock-up strategy (by setting other levels
of p and/or a < 1).
If the VC with an H-¯rm chose in t=1 a price ¹ p that was higher than p*, no NI would buy
any shares in t=1 because the price would be higher than the ¯rm value. The investment
demand of the growing ¯rm would not be met, and the ¯rm would not survive. The VC
would earn no revenues and, hence, his pro¯t would be lower than if he chose a* and p*.
If the VC chose the same price per share p* and would o®er a lower fraction of shares
a (a < a*) in t=1, his pro¯t would be lower due to higher costs of the non-monetary
contribution, which are decreasing in a. If he chose a higher a 2 (a¤;1), the VC who
¯nances a type L would be interested in the lock-up as well. Thus, the NIs would not be
willing to pay p*.
If the VC opted in t=1 for a price per share e p that was lower than p*, he would have to
issue more new shares in t=1 than under p* in order to ¯nance the investment demands
I of the young ¯rm in the second period. Since the value of the ¯rm would remain the
same but more new shares would be issued in t=1, the maximum possible share price the
VC could get in t=2 for the rest of his shares would be lower than under p* and a*. If
the VC chose e p and a 2 [0; B
e p+B], an H-¯rm would separate from an L-¯rm. The VC's
13pro¯t would be lower than the pro¯t under p* and a* (see Appendix E). If a 2 ( B
e p+B;1),
an L-¯rm would be interested in the lock-up as well, and we would have a situation with
pooling that, for the H-¯rm, is strictly dominated either by lock-up with p* and a* or
by the complete IPO in t=1 (see Appendix E). Therefore, if the pro¯t maximizing VC
with a type H prefers a lock-up to a complete IPO, his strategy will be to sell a fraction
a* = B
k(2I+B)¡I+B of old shares in t=1 for the price per share of p¤ = k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I. ¥
We next explore whether the lock-up with a* and p* may be an equilibrium strategy for
the type H with r · r¤ (and if liquidation in t=1 may be an equilibrium strategy for the
type L) or if other exit channels may generate higher pro¯ts.
Proposition 4 (ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - separating equilibrium):
Let us assume that the following condition holds:
k < (I + B ¢ B
k(2I+B)¡I+B)=I. Let r¤¤ := a¤B+I¡kI
kB .
Then, a separating equilibrium will emerge in which an L-¯rm is liquidated in t=1, an
H-¯rm with r > r¤¤ goes public in t=2 for a price per share of k¢[3I +(1+r)¢B]¡I and,
¯nally, an H-¯rm with r · r¤¤ goes public in t=1 for a share price of p¤ = k¢(2I+B)¡I.
The fraction of old shares the VC sells at the IPO in t=1 is a¤ = B
k(2I+B)¡I+B (lock-up).
Intuition (see Appendix F for the proof)
If the VC ¯nances an H-¯rm, the complete IPO in t=1 is dominated by the lock-up with
a* and p* for all kinds of projects. When r > r¤¤, the VC prefers an IPO in t=2 to
the lock-up. When r · r¤¤, the VC favors a lock-up with a* and p* to an IPO in t=2.
Thus, for the VC with a type H and r · r¤¤, lock-up with a* and p* strictly dominates
other strategies (see Proposition 3). The NIs know this and would indicate any other pair
(p 6= p* and a 6= a*) as an action by an L-¯rm. The consequence is that the price per
share they would be willing to pay in t=1 if a 6= a* would equal 0. Hence, due to the IPO
costs, the IPO in t=1 is strictly dominated by the liquidation in t=1 for an L-¯rm. ¥
Under information asymmetry, VCs have to prove the quality of the ¯rms they ¯nance.
This is costly and leads to ine±ciencies. Compared to the situation with symmetric
information, more ¯rms are ¯nanced for two periods (r¤¤ < r¤). Firms which are taken
public after the ¯rst period are sold only partially at the IPO. The lock-up serves as a
signaling device.
3.2.2 Modi¯ed Model
The parameter r determines whether a ¯rm is brought public after one or two periods.
In the previous section, this parameter referred to the consulting intensity of a project
being ¯nanced. The higher the consulting intensity of a project (r) was, the more value
the venture capitalist's non-monetary contribution in the second period added. If this
14parameter was higher than a certain benchmark, the ¯rm was ¯nanced for two periods
by the VC. If it was lower, the ¯rm was brought public after the ¯rst period because
the potential value added by the venture capitalist in the second period was too low
to outweigh the costs. A modi¯cation of the model lets the parameter r vary with the
characteristics of the VC. Mature VCs with more experience have higher values of r. All
other parameters, assumptions and model structure stay the same.
It can easily be shown that the propositions 2, 3 and 4 are valid in the modi¯ed model as
well, even if we assume that the maturity of the VC ¯rms is directly observable and, thus,
known to the NIs and to the VC already in t=0. The expectation formation of the NIs in
t=1 is then conditioned on the parameter r. If the VC has a lot of experience (r > r¤¤)
and wants to bring the ¯rm public in t=1, the NIs expect the ¯rm's value to be 0. Hence,
high quality ¯rms are ¯nanced for two periods by experienced VCs and low quality ¯rms
are liquidated in t=1. If the VC has little experience (r · r¤¤), he prefers to exit in t=1.
Without signaling, the maximum ¯rm's value expected by the NIs in t=1 corresponds to
that of the basic model (see (14)). Hence, the less experienced VC with an H-type never
chooses a complete IPO in t=1, but prefers lock-up with a* and p*.
3.3 Comparative Statics
We next look at some comparative statics results concerning the existence of the equi-
librium and its features. If the condition k < (I + B ¢ B
k(2I+B)¡I+B)=I (see Proposition
4) holds, we have a separating equilibrium described in section 3.2 where high-quality
¯rms go public in t=1 or t=2 (depending on the kind of project in the basic model and
the experience of the VC in the modi¯ed model) and low-quality ¯rms are liquidated in
t=1. If this condition does not hold, waiting until t=2 is more pro¯table for all H-¯rms
than any lock-up strategy. Thus, if (I + B ¢ B
k(2I+B)¡I+B)=I were lower than k, another
separating equilibrium would emerge in which all high-quality ¯rms would go public in
t=2 and low-quality ¯rms would be liquidated in t=1.
Now we will concentrate on the features of the separating equilibrium with lock-up dis-
cussed in section 3.2, particularly on the fraction of IPOs at the end of the ¯rst period,
the number of old shares sold at the IPO by the VCs (extent of a lock-up) and the share
price.
Proposition 5 (ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - comparative statics):
² Amount of the non-monetary contribution: The higher the amount of the non-
monetary contribution B by the venture capitalist is, (i) the more ¯rms go public
after having been ¯nanced by venture capital only for one period, (ii) the higher is
the fraction of old shares sold by the VC in t=1 and (iii) the higher are the share
prices.
² Investment demands (size): The higher the investment demands I of the ¯rm
are, (i) the more ¯rms go public after having been ¯nanced by venture capital for two
15periods, (ii) the lower is the fraction sold by the VC in t=1 and (iii) the higher are
the share prices.
² Rate of return: The higher the rate of return to the investment (k-1) is, (i) the
more ¯rms go public after having been ¯nanced by venture capital for two periods,
(ii) the lower is the fraction sold by the VC in t=1 and (iii) the higher are the share
prices.
See Appendix G for the proof. ¥
4 Conclusion
After a certain period of time, venture capitalists have to exit their investments. The pur-
pose of this paper has been to examine some important aspects of the divestment process
of venture capitalists. Hereby, we have concentrated on the IPO as the most important exit
channel and have analyzed how the timing of the IPO is chosen by the venture capitalists.
Particularly we have o®ered answers on the following questions: (1) when do venture cap-
italists publicly o®er their portfolio ¯rms, (2) under which circumstances do they retain
some shares beyond the IPO, (3) how large is the fraction of the retained shares and (4)
how the share price is determined.
The di®erence between the venture capitalist and the new investors who buy shares at
the IPO is that the former o®ers not only money but also managerial support that may
enhance the value of the ¯rm. This non-monetary contribution is lost after the IPO. The
higher the consulting intensity of a project is, the more the venture capitalist's support
raises the value of the ¯rm, and, therefore, increases the venture capitalist's revenues
when selling the ¯rm. When deciding about the timing of the IPO, the venture capitalist
compares his future bene¯ts from his managerial and ¯nancial support with the future
costs of spending his money and e®ort on his involvement in the ¯rm. Another di®erence
between the two types of investors is that the venture capitalist, being an active investor,
is informed earlier about the value of the ¯rm he has been ¯nancing than the potential
new investors. Hence, the VC who ¯nances a high-quality ¯rm pro¯ts from the mitigation
of the information asymmetry when the IPO takes place later.
We have analyzed the VC's decision within a single model. It has consisted of two periods
and two types of ¯rms (high- and low-quality) with di®erent kinds of projects (or di®erent
VCs' experience in the modi¯ed model). At the end of the second period the VC has
not been allowed to retain any shares. We have considered the following ¯ve possible exit
channels: (1) a complete IPO after the ¯rst period ( = the VC sells all his shares), (2) an
IPO after the ¯rst period with a lock-up ( = the VC commits himself to retain some of
his shares until the end of the second period), (3) a complete IPO after the second period,
(4) a liquidation after the ¯rst period and (5) a liquidation after the second period. We
have questioned the sort and features of exit emerging under the di®erent ¯rm, project
and venture capitalist characteristics.
16An important issue of our model has been the venture capitalist's option to retain some
shares beyond the IPO (lock-up). We have analyzed under which circumstances the ven-
ture capitalist uses this option and how large the fraction of the retained shares is. Our
main ¯nding has been that the venture capitalist holds some shares in order to signal to
the new investors that the ¯rm is of high quality. The signaling mechanism is the follow-
ing: At the end of the second period when the remaining shares are to be sold, the new
investors can observe the quality of the ¯rm. If the quality is low, they do not buy any
shares in t=2. In this case, the venture capitalist has raised revenues only at the IPO
in t=1. Beyond a certain level of retained shares, low-quality ¯rms are not interested in
the lock-up since the revenues from the partial IPO in t=1 are not higher than the IPO
expenses plus the costs spent in the second period. Thus, a liquidation in t=1 is more
pro¯table than a lock-up for low-quality ¯rms.
Expecting NIs' rational behavior, the venture capitalist maximizes his pro¯t which equals
the revenues from selling the shares minus the cost. After the elimination of the strictly
dominated strategies, the following (separating) equilibrium emerges: High-quality ¯rms
with less consulting intensive projects (less experienced venture capitalists) use a lock-
up and the VC sells a fraction of his shares in t=1 for the price per share that equals
the share value in t=1. High-quality ¯rms with more consulting intensive projects (more
experienced venture capitalists) go public in t=2 at the share price that equals the share
value in t=2. Low-quality ¯rms are liquidated in t=1.
Our model provides a number of empirically testable implications:
1. Firms with more consulting intensive projects will be ¯nanced longer by venture
capital than ¯rms with less consulting intensive projects (due to the di®erence in
the value added by the venture capitalist's non-monetary contribution). This ¯nding
could, for example, help explain di®ering lengths of ¯nancing periods in di®erent
industries.
2. Firms backed by mature venture capital ¯rms will be ¯nanced longer by venture
capital than ¯rms ¯nanced by less experienced venture capitalists (since experienced
venture capitalists contribute substantially to an increase in the ¯rm's value).
3. The high quality of young ¯rms with a short venture capital ¯nancing period will be
signaled through a lock-up. Since lock-up is a typical feature of almost every IPO
in the US and most European markets, the fact that it is used will in practice have
no signaling function. Further more, the length and the extent of the lock-up can
be considered the signaling device.
4. After the expiration of the lock-up period, the information asymmetry between the
venture capitalist and the new investors should be resolved. Thus, we can conclude
a prediction concerning the length of the lock-up period: the higher the opacity of
the ¯rm and the greater the uncertainty, the longer the contracted lock-up period.
17Over time, VCs' costs, investment demands and pro¯tability of young ¯rms may
vary, for example due to some changes in the macroeconomic environment. Then,
the fraction of short- vs. long-term venture capital ¯nancing should change.
5. When the ¯rm pro¯tability and/or their investment demands increase, the fraction
of the short-term ¯nancing should decrease (due to the positive impact of higher
investment and/or pro¯tability on the ¯rm's value).
6. When the demands for the consulting by the VCs and, thus, the VCs' costs rise,
the fraction of the short-term ¯nancing goes up (because the long-term ¯nancing
becomes more costly).
7. More competence in the venture capital industry increases the fraction of the long-
term ¯nancing (because it leads to a higher increase in the ¯rm's value).
The extent of the lock-up (fraction of shares retained by the venture capitalist) and
the share price depend on the characteristics of the ¯rm.
8. The higher the extent of the non-monetary contribution by the venture capitalists,
the lower the fraction of shares retained (due to administrative costs) and the higher
the price per share (due to a higher value added).
9. The higher the investment demands (size) of the ¯rm and/or the greater the pro¯tability,
the lower the fraction sold in t=1 and the higher the price per share (due to a higher
value added). A higher price increases incentives for bad ¯rms to mimic the good
¯rms. Thus, the VC has to retain more shares in order to signal the ¯rm quality.
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19Appendix A
The NIs' Participation in an IPO
Using a proof by contradiction, we will show that if E[W¾r(t)] < I, it is not pro¯table for
the NIs to invest in the ¯rm and ¯nance the necessary investment I.
The value of a share that the NIs expect during and after the IPO (and, hence, the
maximum price they are willing to pay per share) equals the expected value of the ¯rm
divided by the known number of shares:
E[W¾r(t)]
1 + d
, where d = I=p(:) . Let us assume
that E[W¾r(t)] < I, and, further, that the NIs buy shares and ¯nance I > 0 (which implies
p(:) > 0). Then the maximum price p(:) that the NIs are willing to pay is:
p(:) =
E[W¾r(t)]
1 + d
<
I
1 + d
=
p(:)I
p(:) + I
.
This implies: p(:)+I < I, hence p(:) < 0. This, however, contradicts the assumption that
NIs buy shares and ¯nance I > 0 (p(:) > 0).
Appendix B
Type L: Decision Under Information Symmetry
The VC's pro¯t from di®erent exit strategies when ¯nancing an L-¯rm:
Liquidation in t=1: ¼L
liq(tjt = 1) = ¡I ¡ B
Liquidation in t=2: ¼L
liq(tjt = 2) = ¡2I ¡ 2B
The price per share at the IPO is determined by (7).
p(:) = maxfE[WL(t)] ¡ I;0g = maxf¡I;0g = 0 for t 2 f1;2g
Complete IPO in t=1: ¼L
ipo(tjt = 1) = p(:) ¡ I ¡ B ¡ ² = ¡I ¡ B ¡ ²
Complete IPO in t=2: ¼L
ipo(tjt = 2) = p(:) ¡ 2I ¡ 2B ¡ ² =
= ¡2I ¡ 2B ¡ ²
A liquidation in t=1 is the most favorable decision because it causes the least possible
amount of loss.
Appendix C
Type H: Decision Under Information Symmetry
The VC's pro¯t when ¯nancing an H-¯rm:
Liquidation in t=1: ¼H
liq(tjt = 1) = ¡I ¡ B
20Liquidation in t=2: ¼H
liq(tjt = 2) = ¡2I ¡ 2B
Let us consider the IPO. The VC maximizes his pro¯t and therefore chooses the highest
possible price per share that the NIs are willing to pay. This equals the true value of the
share (see (7)).
p(E[W¾(tjt = 1)];I) = maxfWH(tjt = 1) ¡ I;0g = k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I
p(E[W¾r(tjt = 2)];I) = maxfWHr(tjt = 2) ¡ I;0g
= k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] ¡ I
The pro¯ts are:
IPO in t=1:
¼H
ipo(tjt = 1) = p(E[W¾(tjt = 1)];I) ¡ I ¡ B ¡ ² = = (k ¡ 1) ¢ (2I + B) ¡ ²
IPO in t=2:
¼Hr
ipo(tjt = 2) = p(E[W¾r(tjt = 2)];I) ¡ 2I ¡ 2B ¡ ² =
= k ¢ [3I + (1 + r) ¢ B] ¡ 3I ¡ 2B ¡ ²
In the case of a lock-up, the highest possible price per share in t=1 and t=2 is p(E[W¾(tjt =
1)];I) = k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I (see(8)). The VC's pro¯t using a lock-up:
¼H
lock = p(E[W¾(tjt = 1)];I) ¡ I ¡ B(2 ¡ a) ¡ ² =
= k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ 2I ¡ 2B + Ba ¡ ² .
The liquidation and the lock-up generate lower pro¯ts than a complete IPO in t=1. The
choice between a complete IPO in t=1 and a complete IPO in t=2 depends on the pa-
rameter r.
¼Hr
ipo(tjt = 2) > ¼H
ipo(tjt = 1) , kI ¡I +krB ¡B > 0 , r > B+I¡kI
kB = r¤. Since k < B+I
I ,
r¤ > 0. Because B ¡ I(k ¡ 1) < kB, r¤ < 1. For r · r¤, IPO in t=1 is more pro¯table
than IPO in t=2. For r > r¤, IPO in t=2 is more pro¯table than IPO in t=1.
Appendix D
Type L: Mimicking the H-¯rm vs. Liquidation Under Asymmetry
The VC with a type H chooses the price per share p¤ = k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I in t=1 and the
number of shares he sells at the IPO a¤ =
B
k(2I + B) ¡ I + B
. If a type L went public in
t=1 accepting the same conditions and trying to mimic an H-¯rm, the VC would get the
price p¤ per share for a¤ shares. In t=2, the NIs would recognize the type of ¯rm. Thus,
the price per share would be pL
lock = 0 in t=2. In the sum, the VC would have spent
21I on the monetary investment, B(2 ¡ a¤) on the administrative costs and ² on the IPO
expenses. The pro¯t of the VC would reach:
¼L
lock = a¤ ¢ p¤ ¡ I ¡ B(2 ¡ a¤) ¡ ² = ¡I ¡ B ¡ ² < ¼L
liq(tjt = 1).
A lock-up would be less pro¯table than a liquidation for an L-type ¯rm.
Appendix E
Type H: The Choice of the Optimal Lock-up Strategy
The pro¯t ¼H
lock amounts under p* and a* to
(k ¡ 1) ¢ (2I + B) ¡ B ¡ ² + B ¢
B
k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I + B
.
Let us notice that, after a partial IPO in t=1, the maximum possible share price for an
H-¯rm in t=2 (see (8)) is an increasing function of the ¯rst period's share price p:
d
p¢k¢(2I+B)
p+I
d p =
k¢(2I+B)¢(p+I)¡p¢k¢(2I+B)
(p+I)2 =
I¢k¢(2I+B)
(p+I)2 > 0 . Hence if the VC chooses a share
price lower than p*= k¢(2I+B)¡I in t=1, the share price in t=2 is lower than p*, as well.
Let us assume that the share price the VC chooses is e p where e p < k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I: Thus,
the maximization problem of the VC is:
max
a ¼H
lock = max
a a ¢e p + (1 ¡ a) ¢
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
¡ I ¡ 2B + Ba ¡ ² =
= max
a a ¢ (e p ¡
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
+ B)
s.t.
0 · a < 1
Let us distinguish three cases:
(i) If e p ¡
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
+ B < 0, then the VC's pro¯t is maximized for a = 0. The pro¯t
then reaches
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
¡I¡2B¡², which is less than k¢(2I+B)¡2I¡2B¡², which
is less than the pro¯t under p* and a*.
(ii) If e p ¡
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
+ B = 0, then the pro¯t is
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
¡ I ¡ 2B ¡ ², which is
less than under p* and a*.
(iii) If e p ¡
e p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
e p + I
+ B > 0, the pro¯t is maximized for a = B
(e p+B) if the VC wants
to separate and for a=1 if the VC prefers pooling. In the latter case, we have no lock-up
but a complete IPO. In the former case,
22maxp ¼H
lock = maxp
B
p + B
¢ p + (1 ¡
B
p + B
) ¢
p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
p + I
¡ I ¡ 2B + B
B
p + B
¡ ² =
= max
p (1 ¡
B
p + B
) ¢
p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
p + I
s.t.
0 < p < k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I
p ¡
p ¢ k ¢ (2I + B)
p + I
+ B > 0
The pro¯t is an increasing function of the share price since
d¼H
lock
dp > 0. Therefore, the VC
chooses the highest possible price given the constraint: p < k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ I. His pro¯t is
then lower than under p* and a*.
Appendix F
Type H: Lock-up vs. Complete IPO Under Asymmetry
The VC's pro¯t when ¯nancing an H-¯rm:
Complete IPO:
¼H
ipo(tjt = 1) ·
k¢(2I+B)
2 ¡ 2I ¡ B ¡ ²
¼Hr
ipo(tjt = 2) = (k ¡ 1) ¢ (2I + B) + k ¢ I ¡ I ¡ B + rkB ¡ ²
Lock-up with p* and a*:
¼H
lock = (k ¡ 1) ¢ (2I + B) ¡ B ¡ ² + B ¢ B
k¢(2I+B)¡I+B
Lock-up with p* and a* is preferred to an IPO in t=2 when
¼H
lock ¡ ¼Hr
ipo(tjt = 2) ¸ 0 , B ¢ B
k¢(2I+B)¡I+B + I ¡ kI ¡ rkB ¸ 0 , r · r¤¤.
Lemma: Lock-up with p* and a* is always preferred to a complete IPO in t=1 since:
¼H
lock ¡ ¼H
ipo(tjt = 1) ¸ 1
2 ¢ k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ B + B ¢ B
k¢(2I+B)¡I+B > 0.
Proof:
Obviously, 2BI > k ¢ (2I + B) ¢ [(2I + B) ¢ (1 ¡ k) ¡ I]
| {z }
negative
After rearranging terms we get the desired inequality.
2BI > Ik(2I + B) + 2kB(2I + B) ¡ kB(2I + B) ¡ k2(2I + B)2
2BI ¡ 2kB(2I + B) > k(2I + B) ¢ (I ¡ B ¡ k ¢ (2I + B))
2B(k¢(2I+B)¡I +(+B¡B) )
k¢(2I+B)+B¡I < k(2I + B)
23k(2I + B) ¡ 2B(1 ¡ B
k¢(2I+B)+B¡I) > 0
1
2 ¢ k ¢ (2I + B) ¡ B + B ¢ B
k¢(2I+B)¡I+B > 0,
which is the inequality we wanted to get.
Appendix G
Comparative Statics
For r · r¤¤ an H-type prefers lock-up, for r > r¤¤ he favors IPO in t=2. For r · r¤¤ the
fraction sold by the VC in t=1 is a* and the share price is p* in equilibrium. For r > r¤¤
that is sold in t=2, the price per share is denoted by p2.
The fraction a* sold in t=1 :
d a*
d B =
positive z }| {
2kI¡I
(B¡I+kB+2kI)2
| {z }
positive
> 0; d a*
d I =
negative z }| {
¡B(2k¡1)
(B¡I+kB+2kI)2
| {z }
positive
< 0;
d a*
d k =
negative z }| {
¡B(2I+B)
(B¡I+kB+2kI)2
| {z }
positive
< 0.
The price p* in t=1 :
d p*
d B = k > 0;
d p*
d I = 2k ¡ 1 > 0;
d p*
d k = 2I + B > 0.
The price p2 in t=2 :
d p2
d B = 2k > 0;
d p2
d I = 3k ¡ 1 > 0;
d p2
d k = 3I + 2B > 0.
The break-even point r¤¤:
d r**
d B =
positive z }| {
I(I2 (1¡2k)2 (k¡1)+B2(¡2+k+k2+k3)+2B I(2k¡1)(k2¡1))
B2 k (B¡I+B k+2I k)2
| {z }
positive
> 0;
d r**
d I =
negative z }| {
1¡k+
B2 (1¡2 k)
(B¡I+B k+2 I k)2
B k |{z}
positive
< 0;
d r**
d I = ¡
0
B
B
@
positive z }| {
I3 (1¡2k)2+B2 I k (6+k)+B3 (1+2k)+2B I2(¡1+k+2k2)
B k2 (B¡I+B k+2I k)2
| {z }
positive
1
C
C
A < 0.
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